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

PROFESSIONAL READING

BOOK REVIEWS

Booth, Ken. **Navies and Foreign Policy.** New York: Crane, Russak, 1977. 281pp.

Why do we need a navy? Traditionally the answer has been, at least according to the views of Mahan and other writers in the classic school, to fight other navies. In 1945 this question was asked again, with the clear implication that since the Japanese Navy was no longer a threat we did not need a navy ourselves. Today the Soviet Navy is our chief rival at sea. If the U.S. and Soviet navies fight each other, the conflict will probably not be limited to the sea and in all likelihood it will escalate to a major nuclear exchange. At least Soviet military doctrine says as much. Thus, it could be argued that the U.S. Navy as it is presently constituted is really an expensive and possibly an unnecessary form of insurance.

"Why do we need a navy?" opens this lucid and most important study of the functions of navies since Sir Julian Corbett wrote *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Booth notes that there are many tools to help us think about the unthinkable, but that there are few tools, indeed, to help us think about the thinkable uses of modern naval power. He then skillfully proceeds to develop and to discuss several useful tools.

States use the sea primarily for three major purposes: (1) The passage of goods and people, (2) the passage of military forces for diplomatic and combat purposes, and (3) the exploitation of resources in or under the sea. Navies are a means to achieve these purposes.

Navies have three major roles: (1) The Military Role–balance of power functions and employment of force to achieve objectives; (2) the Diplomatic Role–negotiation from strength, manipulation and prestige; and (3) the Policing Role–coast guard responsibilities and nation-building tasks such as internal stability and development. These roles and their supporting analyses are particularly useful tools, because they avoid the confines of strict adherence to the traditional concept that navies are useful only to fight other navies. Thus, they are a good starting place to begin study of the uses of naval power in the modern world. They take into account the salient features of the modern world: the danger of nuclear war; the rise of new states, many of which are characterized by political and social instability; the emerging maritime regime as seen in the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea; and the political rivalries which continue despite changes in the international system.

These roles are not only useful tools for study and analysis in general, but they have particular merit for U.S. naval officers because they avoid the "missions of the navy" as descriptive categories. Recently the Navy had four "missions"–strategic deterrence, sea control, projection and naval presence. More recently these "missions" have become "functions" and instead of four, there are now two: sea control and projection of power. This is not to say that these "missions" or "functions" do not have their own utility, particularly

for budget formulation. However, they should not be confused with operational roles.

Budget formulation, analysis and administration require specific categories of military activity, which frequently have little practical relationship to the use of military force in actual combat. By the nature of bureaucracy and beaucratic politics many observers fail to recognize or to admit that the categories of the Navy "missions" are essentially semantic and administrative conveniences necessitated by our form and method of government. They confuse these categories with the realities of combat and the employment of naval forces, which are the same for any nation using military power. However, bureaucratic and procedural matters and methods will vary for each nation. Confusion of administrative convenience with the realities of combat can only set the stage for frustration, bad thinking and consequent error. Booth's analysis is a useful antidote for such confusion.

In Part I, Booth discusses "Naval Diplomacy," "Navies and Prestige" and in a later chapter he shows how navies are not only executors of foreign policy, but they are also influences upon it. In a chapter on the types of navies, Booth distinguishes global, oceangoing, contiguous sea and coastal navies by showing how the different types of navies are related to the specific circumstances and needs of the respective governments maintaining them. This distinction is a novel and refreshing change from the classic theory (not surprisingly developed in the United States and Great Britain) that navies must seek command of the sea. This classic or Blue Water theory had nothing to offer smaller navies which were unable to achieve command of the sea for one reason or another. In the shadow of this theory the French developed the *Jeune École* and Tirpitz his risk theory, neither of which proved to be very successful.

Then in Part II Booth discusses the permanently operating factors. In his discussion of naval capabilities, he identifies the "technical, physical, doctrinal and human variables related to the potential or actual operational performance of the units of naval power." In so doing he asks specific questions and points to specific items that will provide a more complete and detailed evaluation than one normally finds in what passes for analysis. In this respect his analysis is similar to, but more sophisticated, because it is more complete, than that provided by Admiral Turner in his recent article in *Foreign Affairs.*

Domestic sources of naval policy are also considered. Booth admits that it is easier to say domestic factors affect foreign policy than it is to identify precise linkages. Still, he identifies and discusses the "internal variables which affect the general size, effort and character of a country's military policy in general and naval effort in particular." This chapter on the roots and internal influences on naval policy is particularly illuminating.

Booth's concluding chapter is a brilliant discussion of the international context in which naval policy either succeeds or fails. He seeks the "sources of order and disorder at sea" in his discussion of the utility of navies in the context of contemporary technological, social, political and legal developments—the facts of life in the international system.

To those who subscribe to the fashionable position that military and naval forces have lost much of their utility, Booth points out "Military hesitation and scruple are decidedly Western phenomena: even here, however, the utility of armed forces has not been undermined to the extent that it has become fashionable to suppose." In cautioning against throwing the baby out with the bath water, he adds an important qualification, "As with armed forces in

general, naval strategy in the modern world is less concerned with contributing to victory in war than with furthering national interests short of war." This is a point naval planners are apt to forget.

The conclusion of this remarkable book is essentially good news: "The historic naval powers have had to adjust and are in the process of adjusting their thinking to the new circumstances." Booth shows how some adjustments have already been made and he provides us with the tools to make additional necessary adjustments.

He writes clearly, concisely and to the point. He avoids trendy phrases and words, which frequently confuse more than they enlighten. No naval officer and no student of international politics should ignore this incisive and thought-provoking study. One can only hope that the leadership of the U.S. Navy will read and study it, along with the responsible political leaders. They ignore it at our peril.

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Denton, Jeremiah A., Jr. with Ed Brandt. **When Hell was in Session.** New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1976. 235pp.

Secretary of Defense McNamara was aboard the U.S.S. *Independence* on 18 July 1965 when Commander Denton led 28 A6 Intruders to bomb a cluster of warehouses on the south bank of the Ma River. On a previous strike five planes had been shot down over this heavily defended area. As Denton led the flight in and released his bombs a seemingly light hit knocked out the plane's airbrakes. As he pulled it softly out of its dive a second hit knocked out all controls. In slamming the rudder to keep the plane level he snapped a tendon in his left thigh. He and his bombardier-navigator ejected from the plane and Denton landed in the river where he hoped to escape by swimming downstream under water. However, his painful left leg was useless and he was quickly captured by North Vietnamese soldiers who followed him down the bank. He was destined to spend nearly 7½ years in prison, 4 of them in solitary confinement.

Hanoi broadcast that Denton and his flight had been personally sent on its mission by McNamara to bomb civilians and the captured airmen would be treated as imperialist war criminals. Although North Vietnam had signed the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war it evaded the Convention's code of decency through the fraudulent blanket charge of American imperialism. As the crippled Denton was brought into Hao Lo prison he was welcomed by the strains of Yankee Doodle whistled from one of the cells and he knew there were courageous countrymen on hand. Labeled the Hanoi Hilton this full city block compound was eventually to hold some 700 American prisoners before the war ended.

Although Denton was the first A6 pilot captured, his jailers made no attempt to get military information from him but pressed hard for statements they considered of propaganda value. They tried to get him to say that McNamara had ordered him to bomb civilians and in their obsession with this charge he sensed the North Vietnamese greatly feared bombing attacks. As the war with its bombings continued the Hanoi Hilton and its related prison camps became a battlefield where the captors relentlessly strove to break the spirit of their prisoners, using increasingly cruel bodily tortures in the process.

The backbone of prisoner resistance was the Code of Conduct issued as an Executive Order by President Eisenhower in August of 1955. This code stresses the necessity of a chain of

command leadership promoting strict discipline. Its key clause is: "I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country or its allies or harmful to their cause." Providentially a series of senior officers resilient in spirit and body managed to keep this code a vital influence throughout the long years of captivity. This victory was won only by men determined to resist until broken by excessive pain and when recovered to resist until torture broke them again. This amazing leadership and discipline was maintained through a variety of communication systems encouraging morale and keeping the scattered areas of the hugh prison posted on all that went on. Morse, tap, vocal sounds and light and shadow codes were constantly employed to evade the relentless efforts made to disrupt these skillful systems. Denton's fascinating material on prisoner communications and how to maintain them under ruthless scrutiny should form invaluable pages in a training manual for any American force ever sent to fight on or over foreign territory.

The treatment given prisoners varied as American bombing attacks increased or waned with food at times reduced to starvation levels with some prison leaders given only a piece of bread and a cup of water per day. Early in February 1966 as Denton refused to write biographical material his hands were cuffed behind him and his feet placed in heavy irons with a 5-foot bar between them making walking difficult. He was beaten several times daily by tough guards who hauled him to his feet as often as they slugged him to the cell floor. He stopped eating in order that a weakened condition might enable him to lose consciousness more quickly. After 7 days of such treatment he hysterically caved in and wrote a useless biography of half-truths and fiction. He sensed that the prison officials were not so much interested in eliciting truth as they were in forcing tortured prisoners to capitulate and make any sort of confession useful for North Vietnamese propaganda.

Besides being beaten with fists and rods the torture sessions centered on the use of restrictive rope bindings under the direction of a guard all the prisoners feared as a coldly efficient master torturer. Arms would be bound behind the back from shoulders to elbows as tightly as strong guards could pull the ropes. The agony was threefold, the terrible pinching of the flesh, the acute pain as the heart labored to force blood through the strangled veins and the even more intensified pain as the ropes were loosened and blood flowed back to restore circulation. The dreadful epitome of this brutal treatment was the technique of binding arms and legs together to force the body into a foetal position. After one such frightful session frustrated guards placed a cement-filled iron bar across Denton's shins and took turns jumping up and down on it. After several hours of such abuse he whispered *bao cao*, the words for surrender. Trying to write out a confession of war guilt he did not realize he could only make spirals on the paper. His taped confession was so incoherent that when broadcast throughout the prison his fellow Americans realized the terrible ordeal he had suffered before caving in. A message was tapped through to his cell: "We want to express our admiration for the man who is keeping his cool under this kind of pressure. We are proud to serve under his leadership." The torture-weakened Denton felt it was one of the happiest moments of his life.

Over a 15-month period he went through six such major torture sessions with his fate duplicated by many more of the officers their captors regarded as the leadership element among the prisoners. Some had limbs permanently crippled. For these Americans hell indeed was in session. As Denton entered the fifth day of a torture session from

the depths of despair he silently confessed to God his inability to resist any longer and offered his body and soul as a sacrifice to the Almighty. God's answer came in the form of an intense mystical experience wherein a profound sense of peace calmed his mind and completely eased his broken body. Despite what he terms the most deeply inspiring moment of his life as the months and years dragged on Denton thought his chances of coming out sane enough to lead a normal life were one in fifty.

Earlier in his captivity Denton was displayed before television cameras while being questioned by North Vietnamese reporters. While fending off their queries he seized the opportunity to send a vital message to the outside world. Staring into the bright lights of the cameras he blinked his eyelids with rapid and slow movements to spell out in Morse code the letters T . . . O . . . R . . . T . . . U . . . R . . . E. The film was eventually shown in the United States and naval intelligence picked up his signal and had the first proof of the crimes being committed within the Hanoi Hilton. For this daring and keenly intelligent deed he was rewarded with the Navy Cross after his return to America.

It was devastating to the North Vietnamese that prisoners so totally at their mercy would continually resist until physically broken and then after brutally induced confessions would build up their strength to again defy them. For the prisoners' recovery from torture became a way of life. They knew they were united in a common cause to defeat a cruel enemy and this common cause of their fellowship in suffering gave them amazing strength and recuperative power. Denton came to feel that in a very real sense they were making their captors their prisoners. He took comfort in recalling the dictum by Clausewitz: "It is principally the moral forces which decide." His fervent religious faith united with a love of his country continually strengthened him. Even so as breaking points neared and he screamed with pain he prayed to die and longed to commit suicide. Then as he slowly recovered from a torture session he would renew his devotions by saying the Mass in Latin and English and making spiritual communions. He even composed Christmas and Easter poems which were communicated throughout the prison complex and memorized by many of the men. The victory of the Cross inspired the lines: "Dark clouds can hide the rising sun, and all seem lost, when all be won!" Gradually as prisoners became united in resistance and suffering they became more deeply aware of their common brotherhood and God's love for them. Their coded conversations back and forth usually ended with the letters GBU (God bless you).

Late in 1969 the torture sessions and prison restrictions eased considerably. Regular medical inspections took place and the food was much improved in contrast to earlier periods when the North Vietnamese seemed determined to starve them to death. The prison commandant struggled with his inability to break permanently his prisoners. He developed a nervous tic over one eye along with trembling hands and was relieved from command. Before disappearing he admitted to Denton that the prison officers and guards in their rage over the bombing attacks had violated the Vietnamese tradition of humane treatment.

Denton sensed his captors deeply feared that President Nixon might very well have the war fought through to an allied victory and hold the North Vietnamese Army responsible for war crimes. Denton stresses that he and all the prisoners he knew were convinced that continued heavy airstrikes were the key to allied victory. He feels such a victory was possible as early as mid-1966. Even as late as December

1972 when President Nixon ordered the B52 raids halted on Christmas Eve Denton prayed the President would promptly renew them. He believed it to be the decisive moment of the war. Air defenses around Hanoi had been obliterated and the prison officers and guards were a thoroughly frightened enemy. They deferred to the senior officers among the prisoners and strove to portray themselves as good guys who should be safe from retaliation.

Denton strongly believes that American apathy and disunity lost the war for the allies and resulted in the betrayal of millions of southeast Asians. He bluntly claims that the allied defeat was due to the "most incredible and most dangerous string of miscalculations and blunders in our history." Hawk and dove historians will debate such conclusions for decades to come.

As prison conditions eased with the Americans allowed to visit between cells and exercise outdoors the tight discipline of the harsher years tended to weaken. Increased freedom led to arguments over card games with some clashes ending in slugging matches. Leaders like Denton found it more difficult to promote discipline and an unbending policy towards their captors as the war wound down. The prisoners lost the brave spirit which had bound them so closely together throughout the years of harsh adversity.

With the end of the war Denton led the first group of released prisoners on the flight to Clark Field in the Philippines. His simple words on landing were, "We are profoundly grateful to our Commander in Chief and to our nation for this day. God bless America."

This reviewer is forced to wonder if Denton and his fellow prisoners who from jail cells and solitary confinement fought a relentless war with a vicious enemy were no more than average Americans or an elite group intensely proud of their national heritage and determined to prove its superiority even under hideous tortures. Our nation in the future may well desperately need elite groups fervent in religious faith and patriotism. Denton's little book of travail is perhaps the best training manual yet written by a military man on what it takes to achieve such heroic heights.

CANON LOCKETT F. BALLARD

Estes, Thomas S. and Lightner, E. Allan, Jr. **The Department of State.** New York: Praeger, 1976. 272pp.

This volume is one of a series comprising the "Praeger Library of U.S. Government Departments and Agencies." It represents the 34th volume of a series edited by Dr. Ernest S. Griffith and Dr. Hugh Langdon Elsbree, whose purpose is to provide an up-to-date, comprehensive, and detailed discussion of the American federal bureaucracy. This particular volume was first assigned to the late George V. Allen. Upon his death, the present authors took over the work. In the book as published, they have retained a first chapter written by Ambassador Allen on the diplomacy conducted prior to the Constitution.

The book contains ten chapters and four appendixes, plus a number of useful organizational charts. These appendixes and charts enhance the book's value considerably. For example, Appendix D is a listing of 12 foreign affairs manuals giving the main regulations of the Department of State.

For a compact book, its scope is broad. After the initial background chapter the book traces the development of the Department of State to its present organization. It then turns sequentially to policymaking and policymakers, to educational and cultural exchange, and interagency relations. Chapters VII and VIII deal with foreign affairs and the U.S. Congress, followed by the State Department and the public. The final chapters consider multilateral diplomacy and then the State Department in a changing world.

The authors are admirably equipped by background to write a first-rate treatment, and they do so. Thomas S. Estes, Ambassador to the Republic of Upper Volta from 1961 to 1966 (and State Department Adviser to the President of the Naval War College in the next 3 years) and E. Allan Lightner, Jr., former U.S. Ambassador to Libya, have 35 to 40 years of service each.

What is especially valuable about this book is that it is written by "insiders" who know their subject but who, despite long service in the Department, have a fresh perspective and are well aware that modern complexities call for some new bureaucratic solutions.

Finally, the book has the great merit of being up-to-date and accurate.

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Green, L.C. **Superior Orders in National and International Law.** Leyden: Sijthoff, 1976. 374pp.

My Lai and the Calley case apparently combined to inspire the Canadian Government to invite Professor Green to do a study of the problem of the availability of the defense of "superior orders" as a justification for illegal acts committed by members of armed forces. This book is the result. Professor Green graphically demonstrates the problem by prefacing his book with a three-box strip from *The Wizard of Id.* The Knight, Sir Rodney, orders a bowman to fire; the bowman does nothing; Sir Rodney demands to know what he is waiting for; the bowman responds: "My lawyer." This is both humorous and tragic: for, in truth, the poor serviceman is indeed sometimes placed in a position in which he must make a decision with respect to which lawyers would, and probably will, argue; and he must do this quickly and with the knowledge that he may be damned if he does and damned if he does not.

As its title indicates, the book dissects the law with respect to superior orders from two points of view: that of national courts applying national law in trials of their own nationals (the law of some 28 countries representing most of the major legal systems of the world are included); and that of courts, international or national, applying international law in an international context (the decisions of international tribunals and of the national courts of 11 countries are included).

The dilemma which confronts the serviceman is the conflict, or possible conflict, between two rules of conduct, both of which must govern his actions. A U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg said: "It is basic to the discipline of an army that orders are issued to be carried out." A Navy Board of Review succinctly stated: "Predictable obedience is the essence of a disciplined military force." At the same time, international law, and most national laws, hold the individual serviceman personally responsible if, in obeying the order received from a superior, he commits a criminal act when "moral choice was in fact possible," or if, "in the circumstances at the time, it was possible for him not to comply with the order," provided that the order was "manifestly illegal" and "unless he did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to know that the act ordered was unlawful." Professor Green suggests that "the concept of *manifest/palpable illegality or unlawfulness,* which is not a concept readily understood by the ordinary man, be replaced by that of *obvious criminality.*" This latter term might well be more understandable to the average serviceman—provided that he receives instruction in which he is advised that he must obey only lawful orders and that an order requiring him to perform an act of "obvious criminality" is not a lawful order and should not be obeyed. At the other end of the spectrum, Professor Green believes that the

commander who merely acts as a "post-office," relaying to subordinates an unlawful order received from above, would have no defense if he were aware of the unlawfulness of the order. This is undoubtedly correct if we can rely on the post-World War II cases involving the transmittal of such orders.

The author properly points out that there is a general and erroneous tendency to regard war crimes trials as "victor's justice," something to which members of the victor's own armed forces are not subjected, although individual members thereof may be just as guilty as the members of the defeated enemy's armed forces who are tried. As he indicates, the victor's personnel are tried under national law and without publicity. Few members of the American public could name anyone but Calley as having been tried by a U.S. court-martial for an offense which, although charged as an offense under national law, would be a war crime from the point of view of international law; but such trials have been held in most wars.

Two final notes: The author places considerable reliance on a lesson plan which was prepared at the Army JAG School for the use of its instructors, referring to its contents as indicative of the attitude of "the United States military authorities." I am sure that the personnel of the JAG School would be the first to admit that such a document represented nothing more than the views of the then School authorities. It *might* represent U.S. military doctrine—but it might not. And, the Dutch publisher, Sijthoff, has produced yet another volume with the footnotes hidden at the end of each chapter where the reader can locate them only after a frustrating and time-consuming procedure. Certainly, reasonably inexpensive methods exist, or could be devised, whereby the footnotes would be more readily available to the reader. It is particularly unfortunate that such an excellent and informative volume as that of Professor Green must suffer under this infirmity, since this study is unquestionably one which should be owned by everyone with a concern for or an interest in military law or the law of war.

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Guillermaz, Jacques. **The Chinese Communist Party In Power, 1949-1976.** Trans. by Anne Destenay. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1976. 614pp.

The West, someday the world, is and will be indebted to this senior French historian, with considerable experience in China, for this judiciously interpretative survey of mainland China since the Communist Party attained national power. It is the sequel to his already well-respected *A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1949* (London: Methuen; New York: Random House, 1972).

In his foreword the author explains his purpose: "... I have tried as far as possible to adopt a viewpoint situated within the Chinese system ... [not to justify but] to share the ideas and reasoning of its leaders and to understand the feelings and the behavior of the masses." Actually he is more objective than this deeply felt sympathy and admiration has permitted in some others. He accords their due to the CCP, its leaders and cadres, the new institutions and the people while not falling into the uncritical euphoria of the wishful or unprincipled.

The treatment is divided into four parts: The first dealing with the consolidation of the new regime, 1949-53; then the period of the First Five-Year Plan, 1953-57; followed by the Great Leap Forward, communization and readjustments (1958-62); finally a 244-page analysis of the Socialist Educational Campaign, the Cultural Revolution, and

developments from then into 1976. Main emphasis is on political history with considerable attention to factions, ideological views and economic policies. Chapters are usually short and moderately documented. Those on cultural topics and on foreign affairs are succinct, interpretative summations. Professor Guillermaz's analyses of Sino-Soviet relations have more depth, though they cannot provide commentary on each set of statements or actions. On pages 324-330 one finds a very thoughtful summary of Sino-Soviet issues and divergent interests, with nonpartisan emphasis on Chinese positions and rationale. In the longer run, the reviewer is a little skeptical of "points of no return" in relations between states. With respect to the U.S.S.R. and the PRC, this author chooses the period 1962-63; some others would date this from the summer of 1959. Truth probably is: In such a complex development, there was no one focal "point."

Professor Guillermaz found reason in China's agricultural preponderance for devoting much attention to problems of that agrarian economy and society. Perceptively he explains the processes and adjustments during communization, and he provides one of the clearest available descriptions of the three-level reallocation of functions after 1960. Perhaps more could have been included about the implications of these changes for the communes as political entities.

To illustrate the profundity of this writer's insights at numerous points in the book, I shall quote from just one passage concerning serious disturbances during the Cultural Revolution (p. 428):

> Anarchism was primarily the result of the inability of the "revolutionary rebels" to gain a firm foothold everywhere and at every level. It varied in intensity and was generally tempered by the inherent characteristics of an ancient society that was accustomed to doing without authority in times of crisis and based its inner order on morality and customs, and also by the Chinese distaste for extremes. Where any other country would inevitably have slid into a state of generalized, relentless civil war, China fell back on the traditional reflexes of prudence and discretion.

How could a general work satisfy everyone in every respect? Highly as this reader can recommend the book, he notices a few subjects or interpretations that could have been included. There might have been clearer indications of Chinese nationalistic, hard bargaining with Soviet leaders during the years 1950-54. In Chapter 12 more could have been written about the Hundred Flowers episode as a pressure for rectification of cadre styles. Also, some of the antirevisionist arguments and rhetoric of the Anti-Rightist Movement of 1957 reflected the contentions with Soviet ideologues that were already underway in dialogues that had not yet become quite hostile. There is some suggestion, but no clear concept conveyed, of the ways in which Party organs encroached laterally on state administrative (including statistical) functions at most levels during the Great Leap. On page 440 the chance is missed to mention the disorders that occurred in Hong Kong during one phase of the Cultural Revolution. And, though I know why China specialists are tempted to depict Chinese culture and circumstances as unique, I am not sure that there are not analytical gains to be made by the comparison of China's experience with other modernizing and revolutionary patterns. For example, no one overlooks the holistic character of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, but one is not sure whether Professor Guillermaz views Confucianism as a consummatory system of thought.

On the other hand, as indicated above, there are many illuminating passages in this book: the author's comment on the Great Leap (p. 211);

his analysis of the fall of Lin Piao (p. 463); his summary interpretation of the Cultural Revolution (pp. 464-468); and others. The volume ends with a carefully selected bibliography and a fairly detailed index.

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Gwynn, Julian. **The Royal Navy and North America: The Warren Papers, 1736-1752.** London: Navy Records Society, 1973. v. 118. 463pp.

Dr. Gwynn's edition of the Warren papers is an outgrowth of his Oxford D.Phil. thesis which was published in Canada under the title *The Enterprising Admiral: The Personal Fortune of Admiral Sir Peter Warren* (Montreal, 1974). The documents in this Navy Records Society volume are taken from Warren's previously unpublished, official and private correspondence.

Although Warren's abiding concern for prize money is apparent from these documents, this aspect is not stressed to the degree which it was in Dr. Gwynn's first book. In the documents, the reader will find Warren's views on strategy and force deployment, his political ambitions and the problems he faced in leadership and management of the squadron on the North American station during the War of the Austrian Succession.

This collection has been drawn from many sources in America and in England. It relates entirely to Warren's service on the North American station, most notably in the siege of Louisbourg in 1745 and subsequently as governor of the colony of Cape Breton. Geographically limited in this way, the volume will have its greatest appeal to readers in the United States and Canada. However, the general reader of 18th-century history will find Parts II, III and IV, in particular, to be such a close interchange of letters that little prior knowledge is necessary. An excellent introduction and an appendix of thumbnail sketches on each person mentioned in the documents provides a valuable overview and detailed background information. Two specially drawn maps and some well-chosen portraits and views directly complement the documents. While this correspondence does not have the literary merit which one might generally associate with the Augustan Age and "Dr. Johnson's England," there is a great appeal in a sailor's bluff, forthright manner of expression. There is much to be learned from it about 18th-century life and society.

The general reader will face one disadvantage: Many, but not all the relevant documents are printed in this volume. There are noticeable gaps in the exchange of letters. While this is a serious disadvantage to the unity of the book, it is, in this case, an advantage to the scholar. The editor has assiduously noted the letters which he has been unable to find, and in a lengthy appendix, he has listed chronologically the Warren papers of related interest which are published elsewhere. This cross-index to 16 different publications is a valuable tool, in itself, which will benefit specialists in American colonial history as well as the naval scholars for whom it is intended.

There is little doubt that this volume will stand as one of the best that the Navy Records Society has produced. In form and scholarship, it is a model of its kind.

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Hezlet, Sir Arthur. **Electronics and Sea Power.** New York: Stein and Day, 1975. 317pp.

Sir Arthur Hezlet has expanded his subject from its original inspiration—the effect of the discovery of electromagnetic radiation on naval warfare—to include all electrical and electronic devices used at sea, including sonar. This

gives a wide basis from which to cover the impact of these technological advances on seapower, and thus the book covers a broader spectrum than its title might suggest.

Sir Arthur, therefore, starts with the introduction of the electric telegraph into naval operations in the Crimean War, when the Royal Navy used it to communicate with its squadron in the Black Sea. Almost immediately we hear the complaint of "rudder orders from the beach" with one officer signaling "Permit me to resign a command impossible to exercise at the extremity, sometimes paralyzing, of an electric wire!"

The interrelation of strategy, tactics and C^3 (command, control and communications), which are even more closely connected today, was neatly illustrated in the Spanish-American War. Both sides used the same trunk cable to Hong Kong to communicate with their forces in the Philippines and adjacent seas. The U.S. Asiatic Fleet was based at Hong Kong, while the Spaniards used an extension of the cable to Manila. After his victory at Manila, Commodore Dewey sent in a request for this extension to be declared neutral so that both sides could use it to communicate with their capitals. This was refused, so Dewey cut the cable. This meant he had to use a ship to relay traffic to and from Hong Kong, but the Spanish forces were totally isolated.

Sir Arthur moves on to the history of the invention of wireless and its naval applications. He gives proper recognition to my own electromagnetic hero, Capt. H.B. Jackson, RN, who, in the early 1890's, began experimenting with Hertzian waves to try to develop an IFF (identification) device for torpedo boats. Jackson and Marconi met in 1895 and both derived impetus from this meeting. By 1899, Jackson was back at sea, in command of H.M.S. *Juno* and supervising the successful use of wireless by three scouting ships of "Side B" in their "victory" over "Side A" in the annual Fleet Maneuvers. Marconi was in the United States to report on the America's Cup Races by wireless for the *New York Herald*, and also to give a successful demonstration of his equipment between the U.S.S. *Massachusetts* and *New York*.

Wireless received its first full war test in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. It was the basis of the blockade of Port Arthur, as a continuous patrol of relieving Japanese cruisers was kept off the port, able to call up the main battlefleet from its base if the Russians made a move. On the other side, the Japanese ships' free use of wireless was exploited by their opponents to give early warning to their approach. Furthermore, the Russians successfully jammed the Japanese observation frequency during a bombardment. While Togo's victory at Tsushima depended to a large extent on his fleet's successful use of the new communications method, it is clear that the Russians were fully aware in this war of how an adversary's signals could be exploited—the beginning of electronic warfare.

Possibly the most important development of the early days of World War I came almost by chance, when some unusual intercepted signals were passed as a curiosity to Sir Arthur Ewing, an amateur cryptologist. British naval strategy depended on detecting the German fleet as soon as it left harbor, but there was no way to do this. Ewing, in the famous Room 40, unraveled the unusual signals as the German Navy cipher and on 14 December 1914 announced that the German battle cruisers were about to leave harbor. Beatty's battle cruisers sailed and intercepted the Germans off Dogger Bank. The lesson was immediately taken by the Grand Fleet, who introduced stringent wireless emission control procedures, and as Room 40 produced more and more authenticated intelligence, Jellicoe

based his plans almost entirely upon it, so that by the time of Jutland (1916) the Grand Fleet usually sailed *before* the High Seas Fleet in order to get into the best intercept position. The whole existence of this source was successfully kept secret, and remained so for years, in fact not being officially admitted until the 1960's.

Between the wars, there was slow but sure progress in wireless, which became known as radio, the development of fully operational sonar and the first researches into radar by the U.S., British and German Navies. Early use of radar in ships in World War II did not produce good results for the first sets to go to sea had little advantage over the eye. But at night and in restricted visibility the advantage of radar and of its users' understanding its capabilities and limitations began to tell. A realization that the battle had to be fought in the electromagnetic as well as the spatial dimensions grew.

When the *Bismarck* broke out into the Atlantic in May 1941, contact was first made by H.M.S. *Suffolk* visually, but maintained in the mist (where the *Bismarck* could not engage her) by radar. After the *Hood* was sunk, *Suffolk* lost radar contact, but later, believing the British were still shadowing, *Bismarck* transmitted a long cipher signal giving her intentions. This was immediately detected by the British shore HF/DF network, but because a staff officer did not understand radio propagation, the fix was incorrectly plotted and the Home Fleet set off in the wrong direction. Hezlet then says that the Admiralty realized the mistake and organized aircraft patrols to relocate the German battleship, but one wonders what part the Bletchley cipher-breaking establishment described in another recent book, *The Ultra Secret* by G.W. Sinterbotham, played in this. Here I touch on my only disappointment with Sir Arthur's book. He seems to have been unable to use much recently declassified information; possibly he was inhibited by the same cautious attitude which preserved the secrets of Room 40 for so long.

The epitome of the triumph of radar at sea might be the little known Battle of Empress Augusta Bay in the Pacific in November 1943. Rear Admiral Merrill's cruisers and destroyers fought off a strong Japanese force seeking to attack the transports unloading troops and material at Bougainville at night. By fighting entirely on radar and keeping at long range, the Americans overcame the Japanese advanced night-fighting tactics, which had earlier made the combination of visual lookouts, optical ranging, star-shell and searchlights so effective. However, the combination of long-range air radars and voice radio providing early warning and efficient aircraft direction, together with radar-controlled antiaircraft guns and radar-fused shells was the key to the successful air defense of the allied fleets, enabling them to operate right up to the shores of the enemy homelands by 1945. This was probably the biggest effect of the use of electromagnetic radiation on naval operations in World War II.

In discussing developments since World War II, Sir Arthur is once again inhibited by continuing security classification rules and the book tails off into a mere catalog of publicity releases. However, this does not detract from the main body of his work, which by drawing on the history of a new technology, teaches vital lessons in naval operations. All the interactions of what is now known as electronic warfare were established by the end of World War I if not before, and yet had to be relearned in World War II when the battle spread into new areas of the spectrum. This book is well worth reading by the layman, for Sir Arthur's

clear explanations of technical points and by both expert and nonexpert to gain an understanding of the fourth dimension of naval warfare—the electromagnetic and acoustic spectra.

M.G.M.W. ELLIS
Commander, Royal Navy

Jervis, Robert. **Perception and Misperception in International Relations.** Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. 445pp.

The concept of misperception is very much in vogue among contemporary social scientists. It has been employed to help explain any number of foreign policy decisions which proved less than successful, among which are German policy prior to the First World War, appeasement of Hitler in the 1930's and the American involvement in Indochina. Despite the apparent appeal of the concept to students of international relations there have been surprisingly few efforts to provide an adequate theoretical formulation of perception and misperception. Herein lies the utility of the Jervis book. It is an imaginative attempt to apply systematically concepts from psychology to foreign policy decisionmaking in an attempt to elucidate the processes of perception and the possible patterns of misperception.

The book is divided into three sections. The first is concerned with the context of policy and is set off by a perceptive analysis of the utility of and problems inherent in applying psychological insights to international relations. The remainder of the section is devoted to the concept of an actor's intentions, how statesmen draw inferences about the meaning of other's behavior. What is likely to make them conclude that another state has aggressive or pacific designs? This question is explored in two brief case studies of the origins of World War I and the cold war.

Part II, processes of perception, examines the influence of preexisting beliefs on perceptions. Jervis convincingly demonstrates the prevalence of premature cognitive closure or the extent to which we see what we expect to see regardless of the reality. He suggests a variety of conditions that encourage such misperception, among them the concerns of policymakers, the perspectives of leaders, the distribution of information within a government and time lags.

The remainder of the book is a catalog of common misperceptions. Jervis asserts that most misperceptions can be attributed to three generic and chronic problems: Overestimating the extent to which other's actions are centrally directed and coordinated; overestimating one's own importance as an influence or target; and the influence of a policymaker's own desires and fears upon his perceptions. Within these categories Jervis develops a number of hypotheses. One of the most interesting relates to wishful thinking, the extent to which policymakers are insensitive to evidence that suggests an undesired outcome is likely. He finds that the evidence does not support the conventional wisdom that policymakers are overly prone to wishful thinking. Statesmen sometimes see what they want to see but are just as likely to perceive imaginary dangers. The $64 question here is, of course, the circumstances in which perception will be skewed in one direction or the other. Jervis is unable to provide us with many clues.

This failure is perhaps the major drawback to the book. His analysis helps us to understand past decisions, cases where the nature and direction of misperception are known, but offers only limited guidance in avoiding future misperceptions. Such guidance consists in sensitizing scholars and policymakers to the kinds of misperceptions that exist and the kinds of situations in which misperceptions are likely to occur. This in itself is a major contribution and

probably all that the current state of the art will permit.

RICHARD NED LEBOW
Naval War College

Jones, Douglas C. **The Court-Martial of George Armstrong Custer.** New York: Scribner's, 1976. 291pp.

Chances are most schoolchildren learn about and remember Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer as the "hero" of the battle of the Little Big Horn (Montana Territory), where he, on the morning of 25 June 1876, along with his entire unit of 266 officers and men (including 5 civilians and 3 Indian scouts), rode into the midst of thousands of hostile Indians and, to a man, were slaughtered. Custer, a graduate at the bottom of his West Point Class of 1861, was never known for his faintheartedness or lack of ambition. At the age of only 25 he became a temporary brigadier general of a Michigan volunteer cavalry brigade that distinguished itself in the battle of Gettysburg, and Custer earned for himself national renown and a reputation for daring and brilliance. As many a combat commander has discovered, however, the difference between daring and brilliance and recklessness and defeat can be a very thin one indeed.

In that summer of 1876, Custer and his 7th U.S. Cavalry regiment were ordered against the Sioux, led by Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse. Custer's spearheading unit was one of three converging columns ordered to return the Sioux (and their friends the Cheyenne) to reservations they had left in protest of the U.S. Government's inability to control gold-seeking white prospectors from entering Indian lands. Custer was ordered by his immediate superior, Brig. Gen. A.H. Terry, to rendezvous with Terry's force on 26 June for a coordinated attack. Instead, Custer attacked the vastly superior Indian force one day early, with fateful results.

What if Custer had survived the battle that day and had been brought to account for his actions which contravened the orders of General Terry? Was Custer's attack the result of his desire to gain immediate tactical advantage following loss of the element of surprise? Or, was his attack the result, as the prosecution in *The Court-Martial of George Armstrong Custer* charges, of Custer's "overriding ambition (to) precipitate a headlong engagement with a vastly superior enemy in order to defeat said enemy before other friendly forces could arrive to assist him?"

In his superbly written, historically based account, novelist Douglas C. Jones poses some interesting questions: To what extent are a commander's wrong battlefield decisions criminally neglectful? How does one sustain the burden of proving that disastrous actions stem from political ambitions or from a desire for personal glory? What is the measure of an "unwarranted loss of animals and men?" While perplexing, these questions can at least be resolved in a court of law. But should they, or should they more appropriately be resolved in another forum? The author has succeeded in illustrating the difficulty in obtaining convictions for even the most disastrous decisions made in the heat of battle, even those with seemingly blatant ulterior motives. By implication, Mr. Jones also refers to two areas of potential abuse in the military judicial system- "command influence" and military prosecutors who may not be truly independent of, and immune from, those with an interest in the case. Neither plays an important role in this novel, but the reader can judge the implications.

As an interesting reading experience, *The Court-Martial of George Armstrong Custer* is commended for students of battles as well as for students of the courtroom. Jones' novel also provides a valuable psychological insight as to what may have motivated Custer's

decision that unfortunate day on the Little Big Horn.

ROBERT C. BERKLEY
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Naval War College

Rhodes, Anthony. **Propaganda, The Art of Persuasion: World War II.** Edited by Victor Margolin. New York and London: Chelsea House. 319pp.

Psychological warfare, we are reminded by Daniel Lerner in his academic "Afterword" to this outsize volume, "is as old as Joshua's trumpets at the walls of Jericho." The present work attempts, for the period 1933-1945, a comprehensive overview of the craft in all its dimensions. The output of only the principal Allied and Axis adversaries is considered (Germany, Italy, Japan, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union), but the elements comprising that output are lavishly displayed: poster, leaflet, radio, film, and postage stamp.

In addition to Lerner's 8-page monograph on propaganda and psychological war which really should have been boosted up to "Foreword"—there is a 6-page discussion by William Murphy of the propaganda film, buttressed by an elaborate "filmography" of Axis and Allied documentary productions. The principal author, Anthony Rhodes—an English journalist, novelist, and travel writer supplies the main text, which in each chapter is paralleled by black-and-white illustrations and rounded out with a color section. One chapter is devoted to Resistance propaganda on the continent of Europe.

For so various a project the number of spelling and typographical errors is not obtrusive, but one howler must be shared here: The Marshall Islands of the western Pacific emerge (p. 259) as "the Martials!" A few of the caption or title translations suffer rites of passage. For example, the Nazi anti-Semitic theme of *der Ewige Jude* (p. 49), which should be translated as "The Wandering Jew," comes out literally as "the Eternal Jew." While the text several times assures us that Josef Goebbels, the German propaganda minister, was a genius at his work, the thesis is never analyzed. Indeed, the text as a whole, panoramic though it be and jampacked with names, will have little that is new to offer past students of the subject. The volume's index is grossly inadequate.

But such carpings pale in face of the overwhelming testimony of the illustrations themselves. Printed on first-class stock, every drawing is cleanly reproduced, and the color items are at times staggering. Considering the cost of artwork today, the book's price is not exorbitant. In sum, here is an opulent introduction to a very intriguing topic.

CURTIS CARROLL DAVIS

Rider, Hope S. **Valour Fore and Aft: Being the Adventures of the Continental Sloop Providence 1775-1779, Formerly Flagship Katy of Rhode Island's Navy.** Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977. 259pp.

Mrs. Rider here traces the engrossing story of one small 12-gun sloop which enjoyed perhaps the most colorful career in the war at sea for American independence. Equally fascinating is the cast of characters who served as commanding officers of this inconspicuous trader turned man-of-war.

Owned by John Brown, merchant prince of Providence, *Katy* was chartered by the Rhode Island Government to protect the trade in Narragansett Bay shortly after open fighting erupted at Lexington and Concord. During the fall of 1775, the Colony purchased *Katy* "with her boats, stores and appurtenances" for $1,250.

Abraham Whipple, local and active revolutionary, commanded *Katy* in the Rhode Island Navy. It was Whipple who, in 1772, led the band of defiant

firebrands which boarded and burnt His Majesty's Revenue Cutter *Gaspee*.

Katy performed her first duty for the general welfare of the United Colonies as requested by General Washington. The Virginia planter and soldier, in the unfamiliar environs around Boston, suffered from an acute shortage of gunpowder. This condition would become chronic. At the General's behest, *Katy* was dispatched on a fruitless trip to Bermuda for powder.

The Continental Congress on 13 October 1775 made the initial move to form a national navy. Esek Hopkins, a Rhode Island mariner, was named Commander-in-Chief. *Katy* transported Hopkins and New England seamen to Philadelphia where the first Continental fleet was forming. Upon arrival in the Delaware, *Katy* was taken into Continental service and renamed *Providence* for the city from whence she came.

Abraham Whipple was transferred to the larger Continental ship *Columbus*, and John Hazard, still another Rhode Islander, assumed command of *Providence*. The sloop was a part of Hopkins' fleet in the successful amphibious assault on New Providence Island in the Bahamas. Shortly thereafter, Captain Hazard enjoyed the dubious distinction of being the first officer cashiered out of the Continental Navy. Command of *Providence* went to John Paul Jones—his first Navy command.

Jones, in *Providence*, cruised successfully against enemy shipping in northern seas before passing the helm to Captain Hoysteed Hacker. *Providence*, operating next in company with the *Alfred*, Jones' new command, captured a large British transport carrying a cargo of winter uniforms intended for General Burgoyne's army in Canada, but which instead were destined to warm Washington's ever-needy troops.

Next skipper to tread *Providence*'s quarterdeck was John Peck Rathbun, one of the most audacious officers to serve under the Continental colors. Rathbun sailed *Providence* back to the Bahamas, and with his lone sloop recaptured New Providence and that island's two forts. Commodore Hopkins earlier used a 6-ship fleet to carry out the same mission.

Early in 1779, Hoysteed Hacker returned for a second command tour on board *Providence* and, as it developed, he would be her last captain. Off Sandy Hook during May, Hacker after a sharp engagement took H.M. Brig *Diligent*—one of the few Royal Navy vessels to be captured during the course of the Revolution. *Providence* was now joined to the combined Continental Navy, Massachusetts Navy and privateer armada making up for the ill-starred Penobscot Expedition; certainly the war's greatest military fiasco.

Trapped in Maine's Penobscot Bay by the total ineptitude of the senior Continental naval officer present, Dudley Saltonstall, and by a British squadron under Adm. Sir George Collier, the American vessels fled in panic up the Penobscot River. There on the morning of 16 August 1779, *Providence* was put to the torch to avoid capture. Thus, on this dreary note ended the remarkable career of the "Lucky Sloop" which during 4 years of war had on more than one occasion painfully twisted the British lion's tail.

The author follows *Providence*'s history faithfully in interesting easy-to-read prose. Mrs. Rider is a native Rhode Islander, and the reader is soon aware of where her affections rest. In amassing "firsts" for sloop *Providence* and the author's fellow Rhode Islanders, some Rhode Island "firsts," such as at Machias, Maine, and those on Lake Champlain are overlooked. All local patriots are "bold" and "able," and British actions are "high-handed," and their view "distorted." A bit more familiarity with "navalese," the seaman's language, would have served Mrs. Rider well. Although source citations do not so indicate, the author makes

extensive use of the primary materials available in the already published volumes of the Navy Department's ongoing *Naval Documents of the American Revolution* series.

On balance, it is a book well worth reading. And, the Naval Institute Press is to be congratulated for producing a handsome volume which is an outstanding example of the bookmaking art.

WILLIAM JAMES MORGAN
Naval Historical Center

Simmons, Edwin H. **The United States Marines. The First Two Hundred Years 1775-1975.** New York: Viking Press, 1976. 342pp.

Brig. Gen. Edwin H. Simmons, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired) has written an excellent account of the first 200 years of the Marine Corps.

The objectivity of a marine writing about marines might be questioned and when the reviewer is also a marine one may well have cause to reflect on just how partisan this version of the Corps' history really is.

Skeptics with justifiable reservations and marines who pride themselves on their knowledge of the Corps might be surprised to learn that marines have commanded ships at sea in time of war. In the War of 1812, Marine Lt. John Marshall Gamble, from Capt. David Porter's 32-gun frigate *Essex*, was given command of the captured British privateer *Greenwich*. Lieutenant Gamble, with a prize crew of sailors and marines, then captured the biggest prize taken on the cruise, the 22-gun British frigate *Seringapatam*. Equally surprising is that hot-tempered, Irish-born Lt. Col. Anthony Gale, 4th Commandant of the Marine Corps, was dismissed from the service while in office by an Army General Court-Martial. Simmons tells us that among Gale's charges was "... being intoxicated in common dram shops and other places of low repute in the city of Washington." (Marines have always enjoyed a Washington liberty—one wonders what the other charges were.) Simmons further reports that "Gale pleaded not guilty by reason of temporary insanity, but the court found him guilty as charged. President Monroe approved the sentence which was dismissal from the service, and it was put into execution on 16 October 1820." Such frank commentary appears throughout Simmons' work. He reports accurately and lets the reader form his own opinions and impressions. Simmons comes forward with some very interesting and little-known historical facts. For example, at the Battle of New Orleans, 1814, Gen. Andrew Jackson's center was held by Maj. Daniel Cormick and 300 U.S. Marines. It was at Jackson's center that the British attacks were directed and repulsed with heavy British losses, including their commander General Packenham.

What Simmons has done is difficult at best. He has put together a very readable, accurate and unbiased history of the Marine Corps. He has reported facts and events on a subject normally given to exaggeration and perhaps a little fantasy. While there can be little argument that marines make good copy, the problem has always been where to draw the line or how much is enough? Simmons skillfully tells us just enough. He satisfies the casual reader and provokes the more serious.

The book is short, for the time span and events covered, but well organized and full of useful information. Simmons touches many bases in his narrative. For example, he identifies the literary contributions of such fine marines as Lawrence T. Stallings, *What Price Glory?*, and John W. Thomason, Jr., *Fix Bayonets!*, both classics of World War I. He tracks carefully but fairly the running battle of the Marine Corps' fight to survive as a service. It is all there. The early years are especially well done and the account is very informative. The

latter years of the Corps' history, while more familiar to us all, are less impressive. There is a passage on page 179 which discusses the landing on Saipan in the Marianas during World War II that incorrectly identifies the 2d Marine Division as landing on the right or south of the sugar-mill town of Charan Kanoa when, in fact, it was the 4th Marine Division. The 2d Division landed on the left or north of the town. In fairness, however, the familiarity we all have with the events of the recent past has colored somewhat our individual impressions.

Simmons' Acknowledgement and Short Bibliography sections, and the Battle Honors section are most interesting and provide useful information for the curious reader.

Even President Harry S. Truman whose "fondness" for marines is well documented on p. 238 would, I believe, concede that Simmons' history is a good one and a valuable addition to any professional library.

F.A. HART, JR.
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Naval War College

Thompson, W. Scott and Frizzell, Donaldson D. **The Lessons of Vietnam.** New York: Crane, Russak, 1977, 288pp.

A sensible, informed, sober discussion of the American involvement in Vietnam is all too rare. Many written commentaries have been inspired by outrage, or have given vent to frustration. As a result far too much of the literature on this recent, important and traumatic experience contains only a few nuggets of truth or flashes of insight. Too much of it falls into the category of pure bilge and hogwash, authors of which generally have little competence to analyze and to evaluate their subject matter. Certainly they had no responsibility for implementing the U.S. involvement.

We should be grateful to Professor Thompson and to Air Force Colonel Frizzell for providing this relatively short, but serious discussion of what happened in Vietnam. Based on a conference held at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in the spring of 1974, the papers presented and the comments from the delegates have been edited and arranged in a logical, coherent fashion which elucidates the issues to permit their serious examination. In this way one can see clearly both strengths and weaknesses.

It was indeed a remarkable conference. In addition to distinguished members of the academic community, the 31 participants included several senior former officials: Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, Gen. William Westmoreland, Maj. Gen. Edward Lansdale, Ambassadors Henry Cabot Lodge and Robert Komer, and the Honorable Paul Nitze. Although much of what these participants said is a restatement of previously held positions and at times seems to be a justification of them, it is still valuable as a starting point for further study and analysis.

The sensible organization, excellent editing and helpful comments by the editors directly raise important issues and show quite clearly where equally important issues were ignored. For example, Clausewitz told us that the "... first, grandest and most decisive act of judgment which the Statesman and the General exercises is rightly to understand" the kind of war they are engaging in. Stephen Young, who worked with AID and CORD, pointed out that the Vietnam War was an extension of Vietnamese politics. He noted that while this elemental fact was often expressed, it was seldom used to determine policy and to shape programs. This is a serious accusation which requires further study.

There was a general consensus that national objectives in Vietnam were both ill-defined (General Keegan) and

negatively stated (Thompson and Frizzell). General Lansdale offered that U.S. leaders made no true political use of American military power. Gen. S.L.A. Marshall pointed out that insufficient force was used to achieve military objectives, a not very subtle point which has frequently been missed by critics and unqualified commentators.

Sir Robert Thompson noted that before Tet 1968 the war was a kind of perpetual motion in which the NVA and the U.S./ARVN forces could have gone on indefinitely, provided the Americans were prepared to do so, because of the failure to attack the VC/NVA rear bases. To him one of America's "truly effective acts" was the incursion into Cambodia in 1970, because it not only closed the port of Kompong Som, but it also showed the enemy that Cambodia was no longer off limits to our side. Sir Robert emphasized that the U.S. objective should have been to attack the enemy's logistics, rather than to defeat his main forces. Interestingly enough, in the same exchange, Ambassador Komer used the analogy of submarines threatening convoys, when he said, "What we never had in this war were submarines on the ground . . . (which) would really have tied the enemy up. It is those 12-man squads capable of moving in those mountain ranges that would have performed like submarines."

The theme of the importance of logistics runs throughout the discussions. Yet it is never adequately addressed, even when Sir Robert Thompson tells of how he was in Washington at the time of the Cambodia incursion and told Henry Kissinger that this act had gained for us at least 1 and maybe 2 years. He quotes Kissinger as saying, "Everyone in the Pentagon, State Department and CIA is telling me it has only gained us three months." To which Sir Robert replied, "That is not possible. Some of this stuff is coming from Europe on Russian and other ships: they cannot possibly in that time frame do a switch of supplies and beef up the Ho Chi Minh Trail to put all that stuff down the Trail within a matter of just 3 months."

The effect of logistics on the war is largely an unexplored area, despite the report of the Joint Logistics Review Board. It is significant that by skirting and rarely addressing this point the conference participants—both academics and officials—show a serious lacunae in our general understanding of this particular war and in a larger sense in what thoughtful, responsible individuals think is important in order to understand war.

The making of day-to-day tactical decisions by civilians in Washington at least during the Rolling Thunder campaign was an understandably irksome fact of life for many senior officers in the chain of command who were bypassed. Colonel Frizzell quite properly discusses command/control arrangements. Inexplicably he refers to a "new management concept" which delegated to senior officers in the field the authority to make important day-to-day decisions. The use of the phrase "new management concept" is not only unfortunate, it is wrong. Colonel Frizzell is referring to a restoration of the integrity of the chain of command, and of command itself, in which decisions are made at the appropriate levels, subject, of course, to guidance from higher authority.

If our experience in Vietnam has demonstrated anything, it is that the President and the Secretary of Defense are unable over a long period to make day-to-day tactical decisions. Their province is policy guidance; determination of the desired effect of the tactical actions they initiate; and overall responsibility for the direction of the war. Subordinate officers in the chain of command should make tactical decisions, if only because they are closer to the scene and they do not have the additional burdens of the highest offices.

Robert Pfaltzgraff's summary is a concise and masterful statement of the "lessons learned":

- "The need for a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between military power and the development of an adequate indigenous political base."
- "The need to understand the close relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy."
- "The existence of gaps in historical experience and culture requires a broadly based understanding of the country in which military operations are conducted. . . ."
- "The need for a more accurate assessment of the military requirements for effective conduct of operations."
- The need to analyze goals and objectives more carefully.
- The need to establish workable and appropriate command/control relationships in an age of instantaneous communications and the possibility of nuclear conflict.

The great danger of our unpleasant and largely unsuccessful involvement in Vietnam is that we—both civilians and military—will put it behind us and ignore it. We will do this at our peril. Serious, concentrated study is required. To be productive and valuable, this should be free from rancor and emotion. Happily, a significant and important start has been made in this direction.

B.M. SIMPSON III
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

RECENT BOOKS

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by

Ann Hardy, with Kathleen Ashook
Doris Baginski and Mary Ann Varoutsos

Aumann, R.J. and Shapley, L.S. **Values of Non-Atomic Games.** Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. 333pp. $16.00

"Non-atomic games" is a term used for mass games that are mathematically represented by utilizing a continuum of players. This highly scientific volume is concerned with the development of a value theory for such games, concentrating on the processes of coalition-forming and payoff distribution. The text consists of mathematical propositions and formulae.

Barraclough, Geoffrey. **The Crucible of Europe; the Ninth and Tenth Centuries in European History.** Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. 180pp. $14.95

The Carolingian Empire, which arose after the fall of Rome, while it had serious systemic flaws that made its rapid demise inevitable, still laid the governmental and institutional bases for the subsequent states of France, Germany, and Italy. These three nations are treated, and there is a chapter on the strong fundamental Anglo-Saxon achievement in England—a contrast to the ephemeral establishments of the successors to the Carolingian Empire.